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REASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL 
JUDGE IN VERDICTLESS DISPOSITIONS 
OF CRIMINAL CASES 
H. Richard Uviller* 
THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY. By Abraham S. Goldstein. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981. Pp. 104. $17.95. 
Selection is the watchword of criminal prosecution in this country: not 
everyone is prosecuted for all he might be. Some, though chargeable, are 
not charged at all. Others - and a substantial proportion - are prosecuted 
and/ or punished less than fully. 1 Selection, moreover, is neither entirely 
fortuitous nor predominantly private (as in the litigation of civil actions).2 
Rather, government choice, principled in a sense, governs the selective pro-
cess. Whether to investigate, whether, whom, and of what offense to accuse 
are decisions of the first level. Next come a group of choices concerning the 
resolution of a lodged charge: principally, discontinuation of the case, dis-
position by a less onerous conviction than the crime(s) charged or charge-
able, and the appropriate severity of punishment. 
By law, rule or custom, these various choices are assigned to police or to 
prosecutors (not always a unitary agency) or to judges. It would be simplis-
tic, however, to view the office ultimately responsible for any of these deci-
sions to be solely responsible. Obviously, the three organs interact and 
vitally influence each other. External agencies too have an influential part: 
newspeople, the defense bar, perhaps others.3 So also conditions of the sys-
• Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1951 Harvard University, L.L.B. 1953 
Yale Law School. Thanks are tendered Mr. Roy Pulvers, a student at the Columbia Law 
School, for his work on the notes to this review - Ed. 
1. The figures are familiar. Eighty to ninety percent of criminal convictions are by guilty 
plea. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT 
TRIAL, 3 & n.l (1966) (around 90 percent); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT, OF COM• 
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (1980) (83 percent in federal 
courts in 1979). While we have no compilation of the reduction of charges or sentence ex-
changed for these guilty pleas, it is safe to surmise that some consideration was acquired by 
those who "pleaded out." I do not venture whether such consideration, in a significant propor-
tion of the cases, results in less punishment than "deserved." I suggest only that the result in 
many cases is probably some degree below what the legislature or "public" had in mind for the 
crime in question. 
2. Professor Abraham Goldstein has noted that the origins of the adversary mode of prose-
cution run back to an age when state participation was rudimentary and responsibility to bring 
on a case was predominantly private. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisltorial 
Themes in American Criminal .Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1974). Yet in today's 
world, discussion of prosecutorial choice must be an analysis of state action, and of course, it is 
thus that Professor Goldstein treats it. 
3. Even a legislature, by enacting discretion-inhibiting sentencing laws, may exert an influ-
ence on prosecutorial decisions in charging and in seeking pleas to lesser crimes. See, e.g., 
Alshuler, Sentencing Reform and .Prosecutorial .Power: A Critique of Recent .Proposals for 
1166 
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tern itself exert pressure: budget, congestion of the docket, multiplication of 
ancillary proceedings, population of the prison system, etc. As the process 
lumbers toward the conclusion of a case, it is often difficult to detect the 
agency of real responsibility. The discretionary choices of the formal deci-
sionmaker are usually unarticulated,4 and the influences of the other 
strands in the network are frequently inchoate. 
Identifying the decisionmaker is normally the post-facto delight of 
newspeople, picking at the rubble of a visible case gone awry to discover 
some supposed error of judgment in the debris. Scholars too have enjoyed 
the play of discretion in the process, and sometimes seek to isolate the au-
thorities, the better to rationalize or criticize their exercises of power.5 
One such is Professor Abraham Goldstein.6 
As his title suggests, Professor Goldstein is troubled by the perceived 
fact that trial judges in many jurisdictions do not take an active role in the 
decision to reduce charges and dispose of criminal cases by less than a full 
verdict of guilty. His thesis: a more "aggressive" judicial "inquiry" into the 
factors inducing prosecutorial decisions on dismissals and charge reduc-
tions would improve the process and enhance development of a "common 
law of prosecutorial discretion" (pp. 7-8). 
In leafing through a work of scholarly comment - particularly a contri-
bution by so thoughtful and studious an author as Professor Goldstein - I 
am often bemused by the question: how did he choose the subject of the 
work (here, originally, the Edward Douglass White lecture delivered at 
"Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); Pugh & Radamaker,A 
Plea for Greater Judicial Control Over Sentencing and Abolition of the Present Plea Bargaining 
System, 42 L.W.U. L. REV. 79 (1981). 
4. When there is a requirement of articulation it is often so broad that the required state-
ment gives no clearer voice to the underlying rationales than the silence it displaces. Consider 
the Federal Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486(c), which requires that the prosecutor 
deem the grant of immunity to be in "the public interest." The United States Supreme Court 
held that a judge has no discretion to review a grant of immunity under the Act. While the 
statute requires the court's approval, the Supreme Court held that the judge may only inquire 
into whether procedure was followed and may not question the prosecutor's judgment that 
immunity is in "the public interest." Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1956). 
5. Professor Albert W. Alshuler is an important contributor to this field: See Alshuler, The 
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV., 50 (1968); Alshuler, The Defense 
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 CoLUM. L. REV., 1059 (1976). Another basic 
reference for any undertaking in this area is D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION 
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). On the role of the police and prosecutions, 
see, e.g., Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Disseclion, 42 YALE L.J. l (1932); 
Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427 (1969); Thomas & 
Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507 (1976). On the role of the 
defense counsel see, e.g., Bazelon, The Defecrive Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. l 
(1973). On the role of the judge, see, e.g., Gallagher, Judicial Parlicipalion in Plea Bargains: A 
Search for New Standards, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 29 (1974); Lambros, Plea Bargaining 
and the Senlencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509 (1972); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 
YALE LJ. 286 (1972). 
6. In addition to the book under review, Professor Goldstein has contributed a number of 
thoughtful pieces bearing on the topic. See Goldstein & Marcus, Commenl on Conlinental 
Criminal Procedure, 81 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myrh of Judicial Su-
pervision in Three ''lnquisilorial" Sys/ems: France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); 
Goldstein, supra note 2; Goldstein, The Stale and rhe Accused: Balance of Advanlage in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960). 
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Louisiana State University in 1977)? Particularly when the author's appar-
ent mission is critical or corrective, what moved him to shine the light of 
analysis on this, of all topics? Professor Goldstein gives no hint of the ori-
gin of his concern with judicial passivity.7 He reports no injustices resulting 
from executive dominance of the choice to prosecute or not to prosecute. 
He suggests no general or growing uneasiness with arrogance, carelessness, 
or social dullness among unbridled prosecutors. Where is the evil that drew 
Professor Goldstein's attention, where is the harm to which he addresses his 
remedy?8 
In good academic fashion, Professor Goldstein has constructed a "con-
flict" in the role of the prosecutor and claims that the Supreme Court has 
"recognized" that "it might not be possible to reconcile the conflicting 
roles" (p. 7). The possible impossibility of reconciliation hardly seems the 
sort of fact that can be "recognized" and thereby established. But, passing 
the weakness of rhetorical proof, let us examine the nature of the purported 
infirmity which, according to the author, is now opening hitherto blind ju-
dicial eyes and awakening a need for more active judicial participation. 
Behind the "quasi-judicial" mask by which prosecutors kept courts doc-
ile for so long, the prosecutor is now revealed to be tom between the expec-
tations to "display partisan zeal" and to "practice vigorous advocacy" while 
at the same time to "conform to constitutional standards" and to "protect 
the public interest" (pp. 6-7). 
It is hard to believe that this is a genuine, much less serious and irrecon-
cilable, conflict. Zeal and vigorous advocacy can be, and normally are dis-
played and practiced within the strictures of constitutional standards. With 
rare exceptions, the strain experienced by the zealous prosecutor by the ne-
cessity of, let us say, avoiding all reference to excluded evidence is minimal. 
And even the most vigorous prosecutor, directing an investigation for ex-
7. At about the same time as he spoke the thoughts in the pages under review, Professor 
Goldstein with Martin Marcus published The Myth of Supervision in Three ''Inquisitorial" Sys-
/ems: France, Italy, and Germany, supra note 6. In it, Goldstein gently suggests that American 
observers of the continental mechanism of criminal justice may have been too easily captivated 
by the apparent control of the juge d'instruclion. Id. at 282-83. In setting the stage for his 
thesis, Goldstein offers a clue as to the germination of the ideas under review. He reports "an 
emerging concern that American law has been too casual in addressing [charging policies, 
dismissals, and plea arrangements]-that disposition by agreement of the parties may intrude 
upon legislative and judicial functions and that the concept of 'inherent' prosecutorial discre-
tion may be inconsistent with the rule of law.'' Id. at 242. 
8. Three years before he delivered the lecture on which the book is based, Professor Gold-
stein published a piece in which he expressed views that are not entirely congruent with his 
present concern with excessive judicial detachment from the exercises of prosecutorial discre-
tion. In the matter of guilty pleas, Professor Goldstein wrote then: 
Judges have intervened to assure that the defendant has not been coerced or overborne 
and that the public interest has not been casually bargained away by prosecutors. Inquir-
ies are now made into the factual basis for the plea, the extent to which the defendant 
understands his legal position and his defenses, and the adequacy of the advice he has 
received from his counsel. Plea bargaining has been accepted as legitimate, albeit subject 
to judicial regulation. And such regulation has led to greater judicial involvement with 
the facts underlying guilty pleas and with the appropriateness of the charges brought and 
the sentences proposed. In short, American judges have assumed supervisory roles strik-
ingly similar to those of "inquisitorial" judges, while lacking the machinery to implement 
the roles. 
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1023 (footnote omitted). 
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ample, comfortably types out his probable cause and submits it for a war-
rant when he decides to conduct a telephone surveillance or other search 
and seizure. Moreover, the obligation to serve the "public interest," far 
from presenting an obstacle, defines the work of the most zealous prosecu-
tor. To be sure, the term "the prosecutor" employed freely by Professor 
Goldstein covers a fairly broad range of individuals, for which a paradigm 
is difficult to construct. So too, the "public interest" can be variously de-
fined from various perspectives. But surely, one fair definition of public 
interest which prosecutors would accept is the twin imperative to convict 
the guilty and to free the innocent. Vigorous persecution of a conscien-
tiously selected target would then appear to be wholly consistent with the 
"public interest," and is the ordinary business of "the prosecutor." 
If Professor Goldstein means to say only that sometimes zeal conflicts 
with some aspects of the public interest, none would say nay. The "public 
interest," for example requires individual protection from dubious, politi-
cally or egotistically motivated pursuit of the popular villain. Or, the "pub-
lic interest" calls for a fair trial in which the prosecutor takes no improper 
advantage of his office to persuade the jury. In such instances of baseless 
prosecution or overreaching advocacy, however, corrective devices are -
and have long been - at hand. Such comparatively infrequent lapses of 
judgment may indeed be the unfortunate product of partisan enthusiasm 
overcoming professional restraint, but can hardly be regarded as the inevi-
table outcome of the complex role of the public prosecutor. 
More importantly, errors of this sort do not call for the particular rem-
edy Professor Goldstein prescribes. More active judicial supervision of 
prosecutors' motions to dismiss and recommendations for disposition is not 
likely to have much impact on the prosecutor who exceeds the bounds of 
propriety in his summation nor is it likely to affect the misguided decision 
of the prosecutor to pursue a flimsy case for the applause of his 
constituency. 
Finally, I do not think Professor Goldstein fairly calls upon the 
Supreme Court to attest to the existence of the problem he perceives. He 
cites two decisions. The first is Coolidge v. New Hampshire .9 What may not 
be immediately recalled about that famous fourth amendment case is that it 
began as a search by warrant. After some investigation of the murder of a 
babysitter, the Attorney General decided to search Coolidge's automobile. 
By formal application, he issued a search warrant sitting in his capacity as 
justice of the peace. Employment of peace officers and public officials as 
justices of the peace (not so distant from the ancient origins of the office) 
was apparently common and unchallenged practice in New Hampshire at 
the time. Understandably, however, the Supreme Court found the concur-
rence of roles inconsistent with the "neutral and detached" magistrate con-
templated by the framers of the fourth amendment. 10 Invalidation of the 
formal exercise of judicial authority by the chief prosecutor, however, 
hardly amounts to "recognition" of the general, inherent conflict of obliga-
tion claimed by Professor Goldstein. Similarly, Professor Goldstein 
9. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
IO. 403 U.S. at 453. 
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stretches Gerstein v. Pugh 11 somewhat. That case held, basically, that the 
determination of probable cause to support an accusation should be made 
or verified by a court, in some fashion. The Court therefore struck down 
t4e prosecutor's accusatory information for lack of objective verification of 
probable cause sufficient to restrain the liberty of the defendant pending 
trial. Again, to hold inappropriate the prosecutor's performance of a pecu-
liarly judicial function is a far cry from "recognizing" inherent conflicts in 
the exercise of ordinary prosecutorial decisions relating to charging and 
discharging. 
It is indisputably true that some judges maintain a balanced outlook 
and sense of proportion. It is equally true that some prosecutors lose theirs. 
It follows that in some instances, justice is served by judicial assertion at a 
crucial moment where a prosecutorial position may seriously affect the out-
come of a case. From this rather elementary syllogism, however, one must 
hesitate to derive a theory concerning the operation of discretion or the 
virtue of regular judicial intervention. Yet, this is the conclusion Professor 
Goldstein drives toward. He proceeds from principle, as I read him. The 
principle is that challenge is healthy where discretion rules. Challenge pro-
duces articulation, articulation produces standards, and standards mean 
law (which is good, of course). As he states it, Professor Goldstein's objec-
tive is the creation of a "common law of prosecutorial discretion." By this 
"law" he means to "tame" the prosecutor's discretion by "sharing responsi-
bility for the public interest" with the court (p. 75). 
Felix Frankfurter used to write of the "felt need" as the basis for reform. 
With his scholarly background, I take it the Justice meant to distinguish the 
felt from the perceived need. Professor Goldstein, I fear, has built his thesis 
about the scholar's perception, the principle unleavened by experience, Of 
course, "experience" provides some highly uncertain data. Particularly on 
the subject of the just distribution of discretion, or the efficacy of challenge 
and self-justification, reports from the field are rarely detached and often 
conflicting. 
My own testimony, whatever it may be worth, does not confirm Profes-
sor Goldstein's perception, either of the problem or of the remedy. In the 
fourteen years I spent in a: prosecutor's office and the occasional visits to 
courtrooms in the equal number of years since, I have not found judicial 
interest in the prosecutor's decisions regarding extra-verdict dispositions to 
be sluggish. While some judges are more passive than others, and some 
more intuitive, the assertion of a prosecutorial position - particularly in a 
serious case - that deviated from the norm of expected and customary 
discretion on bail, disposition, or other subtrial matters, generally faced ju-
dicial inquiry and required carefully and persuasively articulated reasons. 
If a common law of prosecutorial discretion was silently growing out of 
these events, it was not noticed as such. Whether Professor Goldstein 
would be satisfied that the practice with which I am familiar follows his 
prescribed pattern, I cannot be sure. But at least the need for the reform he 
proposes has not been apparent to me. 
More importantly, I am not convinced of the value of the judicial "ini-
11. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
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tiatives" Professor Goldstein recommends, even if the general mood of trial 
judges were felt to be unduly submissive. At one point, in a slightly differ-
ent context, Professor Goldstein gives a passing nod to reality when he ac-
knowledges "[t]he criminal justice system is already so burdened that it may 
not be able to stand any change that might require more time and more 
money" (p. 71 ). Against this evident and, to my mind, highly important 
truth, the author's proposed "initiatives" must be measured. He knows that 
a simple, routine call from the bench to explain the prosecution's discretion-
ary choice will, sooner or later, be answered by a ritualized rejoinder: "We 
believe this disposition accords with the interests of justice, your honor, and 
affords the court adequate scope for punishment" - or some such. Profes-
sor Goldstein is obviously not seeking to embellish the formalities. Rather, 
as Professor Goldstein conceives him, the more active judge "would deter-
mine whether dismissals and guilty pleas are based on accurate facts, 
whether they reflect rational enforcement policies and reasonable interpre-
tations of competing statutory and constitutional provisions, whether the 
sentences recommended are sensibly related to the underlying facts and 
charges" (p. 68 (emphasis added)). 
It's a tall order. A trial judge would have to reach an independent judg-
ment, in as many as nine out of ten cases on his felony docket, usually 
starting from scratch, on virtually every ingredient of fact, law, and policy 
behind the proposed disposition. Neither general confidence in the prose-
cutor's office nor in the process of negotiated settlement relieves the court of 
the responsibility of full inquiry. Of course, under Professor Goldstein's 
rather sketchy procedure, the judge may call on the prosecutor for oral jus-
tification or dig into the prosecutor's files for verification of the factual basis 
for a guilty plea. But the judge should exhibit, if only occasionally, his 
recourse to independent sources by calling witnesses or the victim to chal-
lenge the "consensus all too likely to be presented to him by prosecution 
and defense" (p. 69). 
Clearly, it is one thing for the court, called upon to accept a disposition 
settlement, to view it with care, to elicit from the parties ingredient factors 
of their mutual choice, to distend the judicial nostrils and follow the scent 
of abuse, torpor, or poor judgment by deeper inquiry and perhaps rejection 
of the unjust deal. As I have indicated, I take this to be common and long-
standing practice, at least in the better-run courtrooms. It is quite another 
matter to expect the judge to sign off on every plea or dismissal. No one, 
presumably, would advocate that such an inordinate burden be laid upon a 
system - already grievously overloaded with non-adjudicatory determina-
tions - except at the demand of dire necessity. Gross and regular injustice 
in the prosecutor-dominated, adversary process of negotiation would be the 
least one would expect the proponent to show. I see no such showing (nor 
any attempt to do so) in Professor Goldstein's piece, nor am I aware of the 
prevalence of such a condition. It is difficult, therefore, to take the thesis as 
a serious proposal for the restructure of the prevalent process and for the 
redefinition of relationships and responsibilities in it. 
It is interesting to have Professor Goldstein's conclusion that 
prosecutorial prerogative to dismiss a case traces, through the writ of no/le 
prosequi, to the Crown's benevolent check on vindictive private prosecution 
(p. 12). But, though the demise of private prosecution may remove history 
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as support for current practice, it hardly undermines contemporary justifi-
cations. Professor Goldstein also touches on the history and limits upon the 
charging discretion of the prosecutor. This aspect of the process is not so 
easily brought within his prescription for judicial self-assertion as the dispo-
sition of lodged charges. 
The power to charge is probably the most diffused of those considered 
by Professor Goldstein. Very few prosecutors' offices in very few cases con-
sider themselves preeminently responsible for the initiation of criminal 
charges. The largest portion of cases are "brought" by victim complaints or 
police intervention in ftagrante de/icto. There is no "investigation" to speak 
of, and certainly no prosecutorial decision to initiate the prosecution. 
While there may be some exercise of discretionary judgment when the case 
enters the judicial process, most prosecutors probably would report fairly 
that in most cases the assessment the prosecutor makes has more to do with 
the offense, if any, that available evidence will prove than with any other 
factor. In addition, the prosecutor will remind the scholar that other indi-
viduals and agencies frequently contribute importantly to his decision to go 
with a case: the attitude of the complainant, the assessment of the police 
officer, the input of the defense lawyer, the grand jury, and often the judge 
himself at the preliminary hearing or bail fixing. Moreover, he may insist 
that, at least in his jurisdiction, these other voices are truly independent of 
his own policies. Even the customary uses, which also play a large part in 
the ordinary charging decision, are not exclusively of the prosecutor's 
devising. 
All of which leaves what Professor Goldstein may be talking about: the 
relatively rare cases in control of the relatively few prosecutors who do 
make the decisions to initiate, and to choose whom to charge and whom, of 
those chargeable, to convert into a government witness - with the usual 
compensation. As Professor Goldstein notes, we have had only rare judi-
cial intervention in the decision to charge. Only where facts demonstrate 
intentional and discriminatory nonfeasance have courts spoken to the ques-
tion, and even then, it is extremely difficult to order a reluctant prosecutor 
to undertake an investigation or pursue a prosecution.12 Unfortunately, 
Professor Goldstein has not looked deeply into the question whether the 
systemic insulation of the prosecution's position (in all but the gross in-
stances of indefensible neglect) is or is not functionally advantageous. He 
has, for example, said little of the possible effects on judicial impartiality 
from more regular assertion by judges on the question of whom to prose-
cute and for what. Supervision begets participation, and the judge who par-
ticipated in the initial decision to prosecute, or to grant immunity, is in an 
awkward position to hear adverse motions relating to that decision. Nor 
are other judges as free to pass upon contentions when a colleague had an 
active role in the challenged choice. 
Professor Goldstein has taken note of the Weinfeld-Wright position that 
a court has little power to compel a prosecution. 13 But he prefers to assert 
12. Cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965). 
13. United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckware Contractors Assn., 228 F. Supp. 
483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Weinfeld, J.); 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE§ 812, at 305 (1969). 
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the ultimate judicial authority to reject the prosecutor's move to dismiss 
(and thereby to order the case pursued). Indeed, he would have the trial 
judge review the original prosecutorial decision not to charge. However, 
the author does not trouble to explain how, in real courtrooms, the judge 
could effectively discharge the supervening authority assigned him. Would 
Professor Goldstein recommend, as a regular feature of the criminal justice 
system, judicial use of contempt power to compel submission of the execu-
tive branch to superior judicial wisdom in the choice to prosecute? Does he 
rely on a sort of avuncular amity to enforce judicial wishes? Can the prose-
cutor be brought to serve judicial judgment in this matter, even if Professor 
Goldstein convinces us that the prosecutorial role should be subservient in 
these matters? Unfortun!ltely very little professorial attention is accorded 
such serious questions. 
Many Americans have been favorably impressed with the continental 
system of quasi-judicial control of the investigatory and charging process. 
Some have recommended engrafting the idea onto our domestic structure.14 
I had not counted Professor Goldstein among that company, however much 
he may like the way the juge d'instruction and dossier system works 
abroad. 15 If his thesis here is intended to recommend a first step toward the 
construction of an American analogue, the idea deserves much more thor-
ough exploration than this thin volume provides. Grafts are tricky opera-
tions. A device which works well within the entire system in which it 
developed may prove sour, and perhaps pernicious, in alien soil. 
While Professor Goldstein does not offer a principled or reasoned sepa-
ration among the several discretionary options he treats, he does separat~ly 
discuss such items as immunity. He acknowledges that prosecuting officers 
do not enjoy exclusive authority to confer formal immunity, so he focuses 
on the informal arrangements by which prosecutors sometimes contract to 
abstain. For reasons not given, Professor Goldstein states that the informal 
device has relegated formal immunity to the status of "limited adjunct" (p. 
27). Looking back a century or so, Professor Goldstein discovers a 
Supreme Court decision 16 involving rejection of a prosecutor's agreement 
to dismiss an indictment against a cooperative defendant; the district attor-
ney having exceeded his authority, the defendant may claim only "equita-
ble title to be recommended to mercy." 17 Informal immunity, he tells us, 
has in the years since lived in this equitable ''twilight zone" by the good 
faith of the parties and on the "bogus rationalization" that cooperation 
evinced contrition or rehabilitation meriting alleviation of judgment (pp. 
14. E.g., Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform of American Criminal Justice (Especially Our Guilty 
Plea System): Reflections .Derived from a Study of the French System, 36 LA. L. REv. 947 
(1976); Pugh & Radamaker, supra note 3, at 84. 
15. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 6; Goldstein, supra note 6; Goldstein, supra note 2. 
The ''Reflections" piece does suggest an explicit combination of inquisitorial and adversarial 
elements. But, interestingly, in Professor Goldstein's "Comment" piece, he notes that there is 
very little quotidian difference in the level of judicial control here and abroad. "From our 
interviews, we concluded that judges in 'inquisitorial' systems do not control or supervise the 
investigation, prosecution, or trial of most criminal cases much more closely than do judges in 
our own 'adversarial' systems." Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 6, at 1571. 
16. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594 (1878). 
17. P. 27 (quoting United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. at 606). 
1174 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1166 
27-28). Occasionally, as in a case involving a Manson witness in California, 
a court has taken a more pragmatic approach and viewed the method in 
contractual terms.18 The contractual approach carried the day in 
Santobel/o, 19 and Professor Goldstein cites it for the "estoppel approach" 
which could easily be transferred to the informal immunity promise to set-
tle the enforceability question (p. 36). 
More important: should a judge get involved in counselling, directing 
prosecutorial choices at this stage? To this major question, Professor Gold-
stein offers a simple line by way of reply. Classical rhetoric must have a 
name for it. It is, in effect, the flip ''why not?" answer to the question, 
''why?" It will not do for argument, even when coupled with a not-alto-
gether-analogous parallel. ''When judges issue arrest and search warrants, 
they are routinely involved in ex parte and secret relations with the police 
and prosecutors, appraising their justifications for actions that are conced-
edly executive and investigative in nature,"20 Professor Goldstein informs 
us. "It is not at all apparent why they should not play a similar role when 
immunity is conferred" (p. 32). I can not believe that this line passes for 
analysis of so large and sensitive a question of judicial involvement in 
prosecutorial choices with so astute and thorough a critic as Professor Gold-
stein. Yet it is all he offers here. 
I share what I take to be Professor Goldstein's underlying sense that our 
judges have, to some extent, abdicated to the adversary control of litigation. 
I would like to encourage the more reticent of them to reassert themselves 
to rein in the American spectacle of rampant contention. But I think I 
would respond to a rather different consequence of passivity on the bench. 
I would try to address what I believe to be a deeply felt need for 
benchmarks, curbs on costly and worthless zeal for zeal's sake. State judges 
can (in New York at least) and should limit the senseless and extensive voir 
dire of counsel on jury selection. Routine and obviously baseless pre-trial 
motions should be given short shrift and no evidentiary hearing by the as-
sertive judge. Prosecutorial delay, poor judgment, and arrogance should 
meet with severe judicial reprimand and effective rebuff. Endless cross-ex-
amination, jury seduction or issue obfuscation by either counsel should be 
peremptorily snuffed out by an alert judge. With such words of encourage-
ment to the reticent judge in the obvious and disgraceful sorts of adversarial 
abuse, I might turn a perplexed frown on the area I consider the major 
problem today in bench-bar interaction: the on-trial responsibility of the 
sitting judge to compensate for, to correct, to relieve the incompetent coun-
sel.21 Though prosecutorial discretion has long exerted a greater pull on 
the attention of scholars, adjudicatory abuses requiring judicial interven-
tion more frequently come from the other side of the aisle. Perhaps if we 
18. See People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973). 
19. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
20. Professor Goldstein's example of judicial involvement has a somewhat hollow ring, 
Are judges normally "active" in the warrant process? In his earlier Article, Professor Gold-
stein wrote in apparent agreement: "It is a commonplace conclusion that judges 'rubber 
stamp' warrant applications and rarely supervise the process." Goldstein, supra note 2, at 
1024. 
21. See, eg., Bazelon, The JJefective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CJNN. L. REV. I (1973), 
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called these frivolous, prolonged, or misguided defense choices "abuses of 
discretion," or if we focused on the judicial obligation to protect the defend-
ant from his own counsel we might stand a better chance of inducing such 
scholars as Professor Goldstein to apply their efforts to where the real 
problems ache. 
Of course, I can not fairly fault Professor Goldstein for composing a 
different theme than I might have sounded in his place. But I must note 
with regret my opinion that he has constructed a thesis on imaginary ills, 
expounded it on undeveloped principles or architectural assumptions, and 
submitted a prescription of illusory if not baleful remedies. 
